1. Purpose of the Cybersecurity Policy for CIP (4th Edition) ("this Cybersecurity Policy")

- Promotion of activities for <u>reduction of Critical Infrastructure Services (CISs) outage risk</u> resulting from cyberattacks, natural disasters, etc. and <u>ensuring resilience</u> in order to <u>provide CISs safely and continuously</u>, based on <u>active involvement of top</u> <u>management (Mission Assurance)</u>
- Essential services for organizing the Olympic and Paralympic games shall be secured.

2. Challenges

- CI operators are gradually coming to take on voluntary activities, and still have some challenges on Check & Act in the PDCA cycle
- ◆ Improve information sharing not only IT but also <u>OT (Operational Technology)</u> and promote incident readiness
- Continue and improve provision of information to the nation through analysis and cooperation with various entities all over the world


3. Policy Priorities		
(1) Promotion of Leading Activities (Classification)	(2) Enhancement of Information Sharing System toward the Olympic and Paralympic Games	(3) Promotion of Incident Readiness Based on Risk Management
 Enforcing and improving the leading activities of some sectors (such as Electric power supply, Information & Communication and Financial services), which are highly depended upon by other CISs and cause a big impact on society in the case of outages Encouraging other CI operators by expanding the leading activities 	 Considering introduction of <u>the severity schema on CISs outages</u> Breaking the barrier of information sharing by diversifying the contact formation (<u>Anonymization, sharing via the CEPTOAR* Secretariat, Cybersecurity related agencies</u>) Study of gathering cross-sectoral information into the cabinet secretariat *Capability for Engineering of Protection, Technical Operation, Analysis and Response <u>Development of information sharing system utilizing the hotline (Automation, Work saving, Expediting, Ensuring</u>) Clarification of the scope of information sharing and provision <u>including the OT, IoT, etc.</u> Maintenance and improvement of CIP capability by improvement of exercises and penetration of the results Expanding the protection scope as "protection as plane" including the supply chain 	 Dissemination of risk assessment by providing <u>"the risk assessment guideline for mission assurance" and workshops</u> Promotion of incident readiness of CI operators by establishing <u>BCPs and contingency plans</u> Enhancing the monitoring and review by <u>providing the perspective of internal audit in risk management and incident readiness</u>

4. Duration


• The 4th Edition will cover until the end of the Olympic and Paralympic games, and will be revised even within the period as necessary.

The Cybersecurity Policy for CIP (4th Edition)

On the basis of the concept of mission assurance, in order to safely and continuously provide critical infrastructure services(CISs) and to avoid serious effects on the national life and socioeconomic activities from CISs outages resulting from cyber-attacks, natural disasters or other causes, all stakeholders should protect the critical infrastructures by reducing the occurrence of CISs outages as much as possible and by ensuring prompt recovery from outages. Responsible ministries for critical infrastructure



This Cybersecurity Policy



Purpose of "critical infrastructure protection"

In order to **safely and continuously provide** critical infrastructure services(CISs) and to avoid serious effects on the national life and socioeconomic activities from **CISs outages resulting from cyberattacks, natural disasters or other causes**, all stakeholders should protect the critical infrastructures by **reducing** the risk of CISs outages **as much as possible and by ensuring prompt recovery** from outages.

"Basic principles"

In the first place, critical infrastructure operators should implement cybersecurity measures on their own responsibility.

On the basis of the concept of mission assurance for all CIs, a sense of security should be nurtured among the public through CI protection activities in cooperation between Government and the private sector.

- The critical infrastructure operators should respectively take measures and make effort for continuous improvement of those measures as entities providing services and bearing social responsibilities.
- Government organizations should provide necessary support for critical infrastructure operators' cybersecurity activities.
- Each critical infrastructure operator should cooperate and coordinate with other stakeholders due to the limit of each operator's individual cybersecurity measures to address various threats.

Basic Principles and Points of the Cybersecurity Policy (4th Edition)(2/2)

Responsibility of stakeholders (critical infrastructure operators, government organizations, cybersecurity related agencies, etc.)

- All stakeholders should periodically check the progress of their own measures and policies as part of
 relevant efforts and accurately recognize the current circumstances, and proactively determine
 the goals of relevant activities. In addition, stakeholders should enhance their cooperation with
 each other, taking into account the status of other stakeholders' relevant activities.
- All stakeholders should understand the 5W1H (when, where, who, why, what and how) of responses to CISs outages depending on the scale thereof and should be able to calmly address signs or occurrence of any CISs outages. They should also be capable of cooperating with other stakeholders and respond in a cooperative and concerted manner in addition to ensuring robust communication among various stakeholders and taking proactive measures.


Responsibility of critical infrastructure operators' executives and senior managers

- Recognize their responsibility for ensuring cybersecurity and exert their leadership in cybersecurity measures from the viewpoint of mission assurance
- With the awareness that their individual efforts also contribute to the development of society as a whole, take cybersecurity measures while involving their supply chains (business partners, subsidiaries and affiliated companies, etc.)
- Develop incident readiness even in normal times and disclose information on responses properly in the event of an incident from the perspective of gaining trust and nurturing a sense of security among stakeholders
- Constantly secure management resources, such as budgets, systems and personnel, necessary for the abovementioned measures and devise risk-based allocation thereof

Policy Group (1): Maintenance and Promotion of the Safety Principles

Look to continual improvement of the "guidelines" and "safety principles" under the PDCA cycle of security activities in order to maintain and strengthen the ability of critical infrastructure protection

- * Safety principles: Generically refer to relevant laws, industry standards/guidelines, internal regulations (IR), etc.
- * Guidelines: Contain items of measures that are most necessary from a cross-sectoral perspective, in order to contribute to preparation and revision of safety principles



Policy Group (2): Enhancement of Information Sharing System

To rapidly address each CI operator's cybersecurity trends that change from day to day, further enhance information sharing between the public and private sectors, within a sector, and among sectors and/or outside sectors

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
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Current Issues

- The understanding of the significance and necessity of information sharing is not sufficient in some CI operators.
- The lack of prompt and effective information sharing system in some CI operators.
- The understanding of information to be shared may not be sufficient.
- The dissemination and promotion of voluntary efforts by CI operators may not be sufficient.

Activities during this Cybersecurity Policy term

- (1) Improvement of the information sharing system
- Adding new contact formation
- Preparation of the information sharing system for Olympic and Paralympic games.
- > Positive cooperation with cybersecurity related agencies
- (2) Further promotion of information sharing
- Consideration of introduction of the severity schema on CISs outages.
- Defining information to be shared Including the information of OT, IoT, etc. in the scope of information sharing and providing.
- (3) Further activation of private activities
- Further improvement of information sharing within the CEPTOAR or among CEPTOARs
- Spreading the activities such as ISAC doing leading activities



Policy Group (3): Enhancement of Incident Response Capability

Maintain and enhance the CIP capability through improvement of exercises and training which fit the actual state of response of CISs outages in operators and exercise needs.

Current Issues Summary of cross-sectoral exercises Planning and promotion of more effective and practical [Controller (secretariat)] cross-sectoral exercises Spreading of participants in cross-sectoral exercises Activities > Spreading and promotion of lessons learned from cross-(1) Reporting situation to Government under public-(4) Releasing information to mass media. sectoral exercises fit for the roll of each stakeholder in private cooperation, obtaining aggregated information customers, consumers, etc. service outage from Govern nformation sharing to NISC Releasing Activities during this Cybersecurity Policy term information σ as (5) Recording action (1) Continuous improvement of cross-sectoral exercises Sub-controller on memo ëd CEPTOAR Mass media, customers, consumers, etc. Planning of exercises that fit the actual state of CI Р operators Taking needs from CI operators in exercises this Maintenance of exercise scenarios reflecting the latest trends Cybersecurity • Extending the scope of participants such as other operators except CI operators and those closely CEPTOAR secretariat (industry Another CEPTOAR (JPCERT/CC and IPA) group, etc.) secretariat Other operators related to CI (3) Sharing information with (2) Sharing information with other sectors and within same sector (2) Increasing participants for more spreading of lessons Continuous improvement learned of cross-sectoral exercises > Promotion for new participants Maintain and Improve the CIP \geq Planning of exercises that fit the actual state of CI operators capability Promotion for new participants including operators Mutual cooperation with other exercises / training \geq Policy except CI operators Planning exercises that are able to promote the \geq Mutual cooperation with other exercises / training Planning exercises that are able to promote the understanding of top management understanding of top management > Return the know-how of exercises that contribute to Return the know-how of exercises holding the exercises independently (provision of a virtual exercise environment)

Policy Group (4): Risk Management and Preparation of Incident Readiness

Promote risk management that CI operators implement and the preparation of incident readiness to achieve safe and continuous CI service provision


Current Issues

- > Recognition of the importance of risk assessment is spreading, but the concept and ways to implement it have not spread sufficiently.
- Needs for preparation of incident readiness are growing in case of CISs outages, but specific directions, supporting measures, etc. are not shown.

Activities during this Cybersecurity Policy term


- (1) Basic view of risk management
 - (2) Promotion of risk management
 - Dissemination of risk assessment
 - Promotion of implementation of risk assessment for Olympic and Paralympic games
 - Maintenance and dissemination of risk assessment guidelines based on the concept of mission assurance
 - > Investigation and analysis of new risk sources and risks, etc.
 - Environment change studies Interdependency analysis
 - Promotion of incident readiness
 - Arrangement of points in BCPs and contingency plans based on the concept of mission assurance
 - Establishment of organization responsible to share the incident information for the Olympic and Paralympic games
 - Promotion of risk communication and consultation
 - Provision of opportunities for information and opinion sharing among stakeholders, including internal stakeholders
 - Promotion of monitoring and review
 - Arrangement of audit perspective such as independent internal audit in CI operators.

(3) Establishment of process of reflection to and from other activities




Policy Group (5): Enhancement of the Basis for CIP

Enhance common foundation activities that support the whole of this Cybersecurity Policy such as review of the protection scope of CI, public relations, international cooperation, appeal to top management and developing human resources, etc.



"Critical Infrastructure Operator Measure Examples" and "Government Activities"



(Cabinet Secretariat/responsible ministries for critical infrastructure)

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
CEPTOAR and CEPTOAR Council

CEPTOAR: Capability for Engineering of Protection, Technical Operation, Analysis and Response

- Organization responsible for information sharing and analysis functions and relevant functions for critical infrastructure operators.
- For proactive prevention of CISs outages as well as prevention of the spread of damage, prompt recovery, and prevention of recurrence in the case of CISs outage, CEPTOARs appropriately provide information provided by the Government, etc. to critical infrastructure operators and share information with stakeholders. CEPTOARs hereby aim at activities that contribute to the improvement of the service maintenance and recovery capability of each critical infrastructure operator.

CEPTOAR council

- This is a council consisting of representatives from CEPTOARs developed in each critical infrastructure sector. It shares information between CEPTOARs. It is an independent meeting structure that is not positioned under any other organizations including government organizations.
- The council was founded on February 26, 2009, with the purpose of promoting cross-sectoral information sharing.



<u>As of July 25, 2018</u>

CEPTOAR

	FIUAIN																		
CI Sectors		ormatior nmunica		Financial			Aviation	Airport	Railway	Electric power supply	Gas supply	Government and administrati ve		Water	Logistics	Chemical	Credit card	Petroleu m	
Services	Electric communic n		roadcasting	Banking	Securities	Life insurance	General insurance	Aviation	Airport	Railway	Electric power supply	Gas	Government and administrati ve	Medical	Water	Logistics	Chemical	Credit card	Petroleu m
Name	T- CEPTOAR	Cable T CEPTOA	V Broadcasti R ng CEPTOAR	Banking	Securities Securities services CEPTOAR	insurance	General insurance services	Aviation services CEPTOAR	Airport services CEPTOAR	Railway services CEPTOAR	Electric power supply services CEPTOAR	Gas supply services CEPTOAR	Local government	Medical services CEPTOAR	Water supply CEPTOA R	services	industries	Credit card services CEPTOAR	industries
Member	1	1	es companies and nit communit y	1,411 companies	269 companies 7 organizati ons	41 companies	46 companies	14 companies 1 communit y	5 companies	1	3	and	47 states 1,741 local governments	9	s units	17 companies 6 communiti es	13 companies	51 companies	12 companies
Sharing Scope of info from NISC (Except	401 companies and communiti es	411 compani	es companies	3 companies and communiti es							and	170 companies and communiti es		381 companies and institution s	busines				
member)	Other (Nuclear material related office, building automation association, cyber defense Council, college)																		

Severity Schema on CISs Outages (draft version)

Summary

Considering that the affected area and incident response activities are different depending on the severity of Critical Infrastructure Services (CISs) outages and the importance of related information, aiming at enhancement of recognition sharing among stakeholders and quick decision making on incident response, Severity schema on CISs outages should be established and discussed in detail.

Purpose

- 1. To promote common understanding among stakeholders about the incident, objectivity and international coordination
- 2. To provide a standard for decision making concerning government activities on incident response
- 3. To provide a standard for structure and method of information sharing

Table 1: Severity Schema on CISs Outages (draft)

Severity	Definition									
Level 5 Emergency	poses an imminent threat to wide-scale critical infrastructure services									
Level 4 Severe	likely to result in a significant impact on critical infrastructure services									
Level 3 High	likely to result in a demonstrable impact on critical infrastructure services									
Level 2 Medium	may affect critical infrastructure services									
Level 1 Low	unlikely to affect critical infrastructure services									

(Source: The Cybersecurity Policy for CIP 4th edition)

Table 2: Draft version for discussion

Coverity	Import on Doople & Cosistu	Impact on Systems						
Severity	Impact on People & Society		Emergency		24/365			
Level 5 Emergency	poses an imminent significant threat to wide-range national life, etc.							
Level 4 Severe	likely to result in a significant impact on national life, etc.	Î						
Level 3 High	likely to result in a demonstrable impact on national life, etc.		Evaluate					
Level 2 Medium	may affect national life, etc.		impact on safety and continuity		Evaluate impact on			
Level 1 Low	unlikely to affect national life, etc.		of CISs		provision of CISs			
Level 0 Baseline	will not affect national life, etc.	ļ	,					
					13			